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Abstract 
Concerns have been raised that a focus on greenhouse gas removals (GGR) in climate models, 
scientific literature and other media might deter measures to mitigate climate change through 
reduction of emissions at source – the phenomenon of ‘mitigation deterrence’. Given the urgent 
need for climate action, any delay in emissions reduction would be worrying. We convened nine 
deliberative workshops to expose stakeholders to futures scenarios involving mitigation deterrence. 
The workshops examined ways in which deterrence might arise, and how it could be minimised. The 
deliberation exposed social and cultural interactions that might otherwise remain hidden. The paper 
describes narratives and ideas discussed in the workshops regarding political and economic 
mechanisms through which mitigation deterrence might occur, the plausibility of such pathways, 
and measures recommended to reduce the risk of such occurrence. Mitigation deterrence is 
interpreted as an important example of the ‘attraction of delay’ in a setting in which there are many 
incentives for procrastination. While our stakeholders accepted the historic persistence of delay in 
mitigation, some struggled to accept that similar processes, involving GGRs, may be happening now. 
The paper therefore also reviews the claims made by participants about mitigation deterrence, 
identifying discursive strategies that advocates of carbon removal might deploy to deflect concerns 
about mitigation deterrence.  We conclude that the problem of mitigation deterrence is significant, 
needs to be recognised in climate policy, and its mechanisms better understood. Based on 
stakeholder proposals we suggest ways of governing GGR which would maximise both GGR and 
carbon reduction through other means.  
 
Highlights 
• Greenhouse gas removal discourses exemplify how technological promises enable 
prevarication through their enrolment in scientific, cultural, economic and political 
processes 
• Many stakeholders share concerns that mitigation deterrence is arising from exaggerated 
expectations regarding future greenhouse gas removal technologies 
• Novel futures scenario deliberations effectively expose and highlight cultural and political 
dimensions and risks of possible climate policy pathways  
• Policy recommendations include separate targets for removals and emissions reductions, 
and interventions to counteract the power of incumbent vested interests 
• Recognizing the risks requires a shift of deliberative register to one permitting reflexive 




1. Introduction  
Proposals to remove greenhouse gases from the atmosphere – referred to as greenhouse gas 
removal (GGR) or carbon removal – are increasingly important to climate policy. Many analyses 
suggest that a goal of limiting warming to 1.5°C cannot be achieved without substantial GGR 
(Luderer et al., 2018; Rogelj et al., 2018). Yet others highlight the risks of relying on unproven or 
uncertain technologies, particularly when promises of such technologies might deter or delay action 
to reduce emissions (Anderson and Peters, 2016; Fuss et al., 2014; McLaren, 2016). This latter 
problem has been termed ‘mitigation deterrence’ (Markusson et al., 2018; McLaren, 2016). It is 
difficult to establish the extent to which promises or expectations of carbon removal, featured in 
models, media and corporate finance, might deter emissions reduction in practice, although 
McLaren (2020) estimates that in the worst case, the effects could add up to a further 1.4°C warming 
on top of a 1.5°C pathway. Given the need for accelerated, far-reaching climate action, any delay 
resulting from carbon removal promises would be worrying. 
Previous scholarship has identified GGR discourses as having potential to sustain climate 
procrastination, and has mapped out ways in which such emerging technologies might be mobilised 
as spatio-temporal or socio-ecological fixes for crises of capitalism. Examining reasons for failure to 
‘bend the emissions curve’, Stoddard et al. (2021) emphasize the role of hegemonic economic 
interests with techno-economic mindsets and ideologies of control. In this context, GGR promises 
are vulnerable to being misused to delay reductions in fossil fuel use. Lamb et al. (2020) map out 
multiple discourses underpinning rolling inaction, or delay, including a ‘technological optimism’ 
category into which the potentially exaggerated promises of GGR fit perfectly. The prevalence of 
‘over-optimistic assumptions’ or ‘unreliable expectations’ of the feasibility of GGR has been 
highlighted in recent reviews of the GGR included in countries’ low-emission development plans 
(Thoni et al., 2020) and of particular GGR techniques (Waller et al., 2020)1. 
Other scholars have suggested that GGR innovations and promises might be understood as 
prospective spatio-temporal fixes - following Harvey (2003) and Jessop (2006) - in which not only 
engineered technologies and infrastructures but also managed landscapes and biophysical processes 
are enrolled as responses to capitalist crises (Sapinski, 2016; Carton, 2019; Ekers and Prudham, 
2017). In previous and parallel work (Markusson et al., 2018; Markusson et al., forthcoming), we 
locate such technological promises as a key element in the cultural political economy of climate 
change, in which innovation narratives and imaginaries are simultaneously a product of, and a 
means to sustain hegemonic economic power, via concepts and processes particularly including 
commodification (Jessop, 2009; Sum and Jessop, 2013). Concerns regarding the ways in which 
commodification and marketization of climate change reshape the science and technologies of 
mitigation, entrenching institutions and procedures that resist transformative change, are long-
standing (Lohmann, 2005; Newell and Paterson, 2010). More recently scholars have highlighted how 
treating carbon as fungible (and as an isolated metric) has undesirable consequences, generating 
both a set of false equivalences (Carton et al., 2021) and a set of political, and associated epistemic 
presumptions (Moreno et al., 2015) which tend to separate considerations of climate policy from 
those of power. Our work adds to this literature in that it applies the concept of mitigation 
deterrence to the arena of emerging policy and practice for GGR, so as to explore in detail the 
mechanisms and impacts of both spatial and temporal dimensions of inappropriate carbon 
fungibility and re-emplace climate concerns and responses in the context of the cultural political 
economy.    
                                                          
1 Waller et al consider bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) and afforestation. 
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In this paper we report findings from deliberative workshops regarding whether and in what ways 
stakeholders in carbon removal hold concerns about mitigation deterrence, the mechanisms which 
they see as plausible sources of delay, and the measures that they suggest might be taken to 
minimise negative impacts. Our findings cast new light on the dynamics of delay, the limitations and 
pitfalls of offsetting and the commodification of carbon, and on the politics of technological and 
spatio-temporal fixes. We use ‘delay’ as the primary term in preference to more normatively loaded 
concepts such as prevarication or procrastination because the problem is not necessarily a product 
of deliberate intervention, but can also emerge systemically.    
In climate science and policy, GGR is understood to serve two purposes. First, to help achieve ‘net 
zero’ emissions targets by balancing any residual or ‘recalcitrant’ emissions. Second, to compensate 
for any overshoot in greenhouse gas emissions over time, by subsequently drawing down carbon 
from the atmosphere. There would be little reason to worry about deterrence in either case if the 
amounts involved could be objectively defined and fixed in advance. Yet both ‘recalcitrant’ emissions 
and ‘unavoidable’ overshoot are matters of political debate and scientific uncertainty. Climate 
scientists, policymakers, publics and commercial interests interact to shape definitions and 
expectations. Proposals and promises of GGR technologies also affect expectations and definitions of 
recalcitrance and overshoot. Put simply, the more plausible or attractive the GGR offer, the weaker 
the apparent carbon budget constraint, and the greater the incentive to broaden the definition of 
recalcitrant emissions, and to accept larger overshoot.  
Previous research has reported public opinions and views regarding carbon dioxide removal (CDR) 
technologies. Concerns about mitigation deterrence have been shown to detract from public 
support for various forms of carbon removal in both the UK and US (Bellamy et al., 2019; Cox et al., 
2020). Our deliberative stakeholder workshops explored the social and cultural interactions between 
carbon removal and emissions reduction promises and practices, involving a diverse range of 
stakeholders and experts (rather than publics), focusing on whether and how mitigation deterrence 
might manifest in various political scenarios, and how it might be minimised. 
The paper continues with a description of the theoretical orientation and methodology of the 
project (section 2). After that, we report (section 3.1) participants’ views on the nature and 
plausibility of scenarios with mechanisms of deterrence, and the political and economic drivers that 
might favour deterrence and delay. Subsequently (section 3.2), we review claims made about 
mitigation deterrence to identify discursive strategies deployed by advocates of GGR. On the 
surface, such strategies deflect concerns about mitigation deterrence, but we argue that at a deeper 
level they illustrate the pervasiveness of the problem. The paper then outlines (section 3.3) the 
measures that participants recommended to promote GGR whilst avoiding or minimising mitigation 
deterrence.  
Section 4 discusses these findings, and in conclusion, we suggest that mitigation deterrence caused 
by GGR promises should be understood as just one example of an ‘attraction of delay’ within a 
cultural and political setting that provides many incentives for procrastination. We highlight possible 




2. Purpose and methods  
We convened nine deliberative workshops in 2018 and 2019 in which we exposed climate/GGR 
experts and stakeholders2 to speculative futures scenarios involving mitigation deterrence. Our aim 
was to identify and examine ways in which it might arise and to stimulate responses as to how to 
minimise it in practice. Five face-to-face workshops were convened in London; and four online using 
Zoom, with a range of international participants. Each workshop involved between six and nine 
stakeholders for an aggregate total of 66 participants. 
Participants were recruited using a snowball method amongst academics, experts and other 
stakeholders identified through the literature, conference participation, and media commentary. 
Particular efforts were made to include relevant policy makers, environmental NGOs, labour unions 
and climate journalists. More generic and future-oriented public interests were included by involving 
students taking climate politics and environmental technology courses.3 While the participants were 
broadly drawn from social elite groups, by making the workshop groups diverse in initial opinions 
and presumptions, we sought to enable debate and reflexivity. In total, the workshops involved 21 
academics, 15 participants from industry or consultancy, 11 from NGOs or unions, 5 from policy-
making bodies, 4 from media and 10 students. Only 16 of the 66 participants were women. Although 
this reflects the GGR field in general, we sought to remain alert to the gender imbalance in these 
discussions.   
Each workshop took the same basic structure, following a detailed facilitation guide prepared in 
advance (see supplementary material). The workshops were structured around discussion of 
scenarios for deployment of GGRs developed by the research team drawing on the GGR literature 
and expert interviews (n=17) regarding the plausible development, scale and promises of GGR 
technologies. Each scenario was designed to describe a plausible future (Wilkinson et al., 2013) to 
2050 in which GGR (either generically, or in the form of one of four specific technologies) offered 
significant promise, but also undermined progress on emissions reduction. The four technologies 
considered in detail were bioenergy with carbon capture and storage, direct air capture, soil carbon 
restoration, and enhanced weathering. The scenario narratives offered a framework to elicit 
responses and collective discussion about the extent, nature, mechanisms and drivers of mitigation 
deterrence effects arising in consideration of GGR, both testing and permitting the stakeholders 
involved to interrogate and challenge our existing hypotheses (illustrated in the scenarios).  
The workshops, scenarios and facilitation approaches were all designed to enable participants to 
adopt a situated, strategic4 perspective as part of a collective group, rather than that of a singular, 
isolated, external ‘objective’ observer (Tyfield, 2020; Flyvbjerg et al., 2012) and thus developing and 
adapting their views through an iterative and reflexive form of ‘public reasoning’ (Burchardt, 2014). 
In practice this involved using the scenarios to facilitate and stimulate situated discussion and 
responses and doing so iteratively across three temporal horizons, as described later in this section.  
This design approach reflects a perspective on technological promises grounded in cultural political 
economy (CPE) (Markusson et al., 2018; McLaren and Markusson, 2020; Sum and Jessop, 2013). CPE 
                                                          
2 Stakeholders are here understood as those with knowledge about or an interest in GGR, including those who 
may be affected by promises and projects, as well as those with power to affect such developments. While 
‘stakeholder’ terminology and practices can be depoliticising (Swyngedouw 2004), our workshops explicitly 
politicised the issues at hand through the use of politically contrasting scenarios.  
3 Student participants were offered a small honorarium. For other participants, the same sum was donated to 
a charity of their choice. 
4 Strategic’ is here used the sense of having regard to wider longer-term or overall aims and objectives and the 
means to achieve them, as opposed to a narrow focus on immediate or limited aims. 
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combines the insights of social constructivism (the ‘cultural’) with a material political economy, 
identifying systemic and emergent effects. This ‘CPE register’ – in which hegemonic economic 
power, promises and imaginaries of technological fixes, and market ideologies of commodification 
and trading are critical considerations – contrasts with a conventional and dominant ‘rationalist 
register’ in discourse which emphasizes objectivity and reason, for instance by privileging the 
aggregate effects of individual decisions over emergent cultural effects (Markusson et al., 2018). The 
rationalist register reflects a family of well-established ‘civic epistemologies’ (Jasanoff, 2007)  
prevalent in the western (neo)liberal world – including the countries from which our participants 
were mainly drawn – which centre calculative, consequentialist and utilitarian analysis and universal 
principles (Nardin, 2015). The move to a CPE register involves not only reframing the issue at stake, 
from techno-economic feasibility to ‘responsible development’ (Waller et al., 2020), but also a shift 
in subjectivity.  
For each workshop, scenarios considered the same technology (or GGR generically) under two 
imagined political futures, selected from a matrix of four alternatives based loosely on grid/group 
theory (Douglas, 1970). Alongside a ‘business as usual’ future in which global politics remains much 
as at present (weakly neoliberal, and at best ‘muddling through’ in face of populist and authoritarian 
challenges), we postulated three diverse and stylized futures – one each based on strong publics 
(more egalitarian and progressive), strong leaders (an authoritarian turn) and strong markets (a 
revived neo-liberalism) (see Table 1 and supplementary material). In each workshop one scenario 
was described in detail in three temporal steps, with a sequence that ran through GGR promises (in 
2020), disappointing results (in 2030) and finally some clarity as to how and why GGR had deterred 
emissions reduction (in 2050). These temporal steps enabled participants to collectively revisit their 
responses to the emanations of mitigation deterrence described. The second scenario was 
presented only in summary (as a retrospective from 2050), to provide contrasting political stimulus 
for facilitated discussion. The scenarios were consistently paired: ‘business as usual’ was contrasted 
with ‘progressive politics’; or ‘revived neoliberalism’ with the ‘authoritarian turn’ and across the set 
of workshops both pairs were applied to each of the four technologies. The arrangement of 
‘diagonally opposite’ pairs was designed to leave both axes of the grid/group matrix applicable in 
each workshop.  
The workshops were recorded, transcribed, anonymised and analysed qualitatively using Atlas.ti. 
Following the workshops, the team constructed a coding guide, and each transcript was coded by 
two separate readers. Conflicting codings were resolved by the lead reader, who read and coded all 
nine transcripts. The purpose of the analysis was to identify and follow ideas and narratives as they 
evolved through each discussion, rather than focusing on which individual said what. Nonetheless 
such analysis of deliberation can offer insights into individual as well as collective responses to the 
ideas and narratives under discussion (Burchardt, 2013). In other words, we sought to work at the 
interface between ideas and actors, understood as a space where technologies and regimes are 
rhetorically constructed and reconstructed.  We recognise that such engagements also construct and 
reconstruct forms of subjectivity and collectivity amongst participants (Chilvers and Kearnes, 2019; 
Bellamy and Lezaun, 2017). The analysis that follows is therefore both interpretive and evaluative, 
alert both to how perspectives can be constructed in the discussions and to our own positionality in 
the discussions. The quotations used in the following text are identified by an Atlas code which 
refers to the transcript and specific marked text.5 
 
                                                          
5 For readers interested in how the cited quotes represent the richer material, see supplementary material. 
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Table 1: Key features of the workshop scenarios  
Scenario Politics GGR 
technique 
Key features Workshop 
formats 
1.1 Business as 
usual 
Generic Extensive carbon markets promised but dogged by 
political delay, carbon fraud prevalent in offsetting 
markets, GGR deployed only in profitable niches, 




F2F & Virtual 
 
1.2 Business as 
usual 
BECCS Innovative methods promise BECCS with limited 
land-use conflicts. Technical, political and 
commercial factors limit adoption, with carbon 
markets favouring biomass cofiring without CCS. 
BECCS promises continue to be mobilised by fossil 
fuel and power companies to sweat assets, and 
actual deployment is limited to sites where 
enhanced oil recovery is possible.  
3-step 
 
F2F & Virtual 
 
 




Soil carbon promises adopted internationally, 
backed by carbon credits and blockchain 
technologies. Removals delayed by conflicts over 
agricultural support regimes. Benefits prove more 
limited than promised, and are offset by more 
livestock production. Soil carbon stores leak in 
warming climate. Fraud proves widespread in many 






2.1 Progressive / 
egalitarian 
Generic Green New Deal promised to lead transition. Public 
opposition to tech fixes (nuclear and CCS) slows 
mitigation, and political conflicts over land-grabbing 
slows GGR, leading to emergence of justice-based 
movements calling for carbon removal instead of 
mitigation.   
3-step  
 
F2F & Virtual 
 
 
2.2 Progressive / 
egalitarian 
BECCS Economic and financial bubbles and crashes of the 
2020s sideline climate policy. Progressive leaders in 
2030s promise redistribution, job creation, fair 
climate action and respect for human rights. Major 
economies reject nuclear power, making carbon 
budgets hard to balance. BECCS is endorsed at global 
summits in 2032 and 2037 but low investment 
confidence combined with activist opposition to 




F2F & Virtual 
 
 




Economic and financial crashes lead to elections of 
progressive leaders promising redistribution, job 
creation and respect for human rights. In climate 
policy, soil carbon removal and afforestation are 
preferred to capital-intensive measures (from public 
transport to DAC). Nuclear power and CCS are 
rejected to please progressive voters. Soil and forest 
removals are undermined both by leakage and by 
emission rebounds, as the ‘Soil-cialist movement’ 








Generic Chinese led ‘climate emergency’ plans for carbon 
removals and population relocation; indiscriminate 
deployment of GGR undermines performance and 







corporate/state interests maintain substantial power 






China and US compete to develop DAC technologies 
in response to growing climate impacts. US focuses 
on synthetic fuel market, not storage. DAC 
deployment is limited, and also diverted into 
international offset schemes. Authoritarian regimes 
restrict some domestic emissions, but continue to 
enable fossil extractivism. Carbon intensity of energy 
production remains relatively high, undermining net 










Innovations in grinding technology generate 
promises of enhanced weathering carbon removal, 
adopted by various populist leaders for diverse 
reasons (mining interests, agricultural co-benefits, 
even as anti-colonial rhetoric). Effects are 
undermined by land-use rebounds, and 
unexpectedly rapid saturation of carbon storage. But 
political strength of mining and other interests locks 
in policy despite shortcomings, while growing 







Generic Cities and corporations promote market-based 
climate pact; boom in financial instruments for 
‘climate hedging’; carbon removal technology gets 
locked into carbon utilisation applications, while 






DAC EU-China carbon-market deal triggers neoliberal 
climate policy with a focus on carbon removal by 
innovative direct air capture. Markets deliver carbon 
capture, but not storage, with high rates of diversion 
of carbon to utilisation, and much offsetting of 
continued fossil fuel use. Slow development of 
carbon storage and transmission facilities limits 








EW Resistance from financial interests to closing borders 
and rising tariffs triggers a trade boom and global 
growth (slowing emissions reduction). Revived 
neoliberal climate efforts establish global carbon 
markets – including carbon removal. Volatility in 
carbon markets generates a dash for enhanced 
weathering. Promises of future removals mask short-







3. Deliberating about mitigation deterrence 
In this section we outline the findings from the workshops, in three stages. First, we investigate the 
extent and nature of concerns about mitigation deterrence and its possible drivers and mechanisms. 
Second, we explore the arguments raised to suggest that mitigation deterrence might not occur. 
Finally, we summarise the interventions that were suggested to maximise greenhouse gas removals, 
while not impairing other efforts to reduce carbon emissions.  
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3.1 Drivers and mechanisms of deterrence  
Across the workshops, participants expressed common understandings of the ways in which 
mitigation deterrence could occur. The use of scenarios, and particularly the elaboration of ‘social 
imaginaries’ - shared understandings of how the world works (Groves, 2014; Taylor, 2003; Jasanoff, 
2015) helped participants to explore the issue. 
Social imaginaries and attractions of delay 
Participants mapped out a broad social imaginary in which social change is resisted, identifying 
(what we call) ‘attractions of delay’: reasons why key actors, including publics, businesses, and 
politicians, might want to delay action on climate. Participants emphasised how high-carbon 
industries are economically locked-in and structurally powerful, and strongly motivated to find any 
possible loopholes (or even to behave fraudulently) to exploit otherwise potentially stranded assets.  
As one participant said, “the allure of negative emissions” is that “it delays action to the future … 
that temptation will still be there to think we’ll still be able to recover in the future by relying on 
negative emissions.” (24:38). Another emphasized that: “a system where we can continue 
consuming is going to be preferred by the public, by the government, by industry. That’s why that 
potential problem with GGR, as we’ve been saying, [is that] it allows for continued emissions” 
(29:30). And no-one is prepared to bear the costs of delivery. As one participant explained, industry 
representatives might claim “It’s down to the government to do all this”, but “the government’s 
saying ‘no we haven’t got any money. It’s down to the industry’” (29:32). 
In another group it was suggested that mitigation deterrence happens “largely because we’re locked 
into existing structures. … we can’t just leave it up to markets, we can’t just leave it up to the 
invisible hand of innovation to come up with something better. We need to actually actively close 
down these systems” (22:103). In other words, without efforts to close down fossil industries they 
will inevitably promise GGR to enable continued extraction and use of fossil fuels. Moreover, 
business is expected to avoid material action as far as possible, by manipulating and gaming carbon 
markets and offsetting systems: “The thing with any system you put together … Barclays Bank have 
some skyscraper in Canary Wharf full of people just looking for loopholes” (29:73). 
The discussions often implicated modelling as part of the ingrained structures of policy delay. 
Integrated assessment modelling puts forward cost-optimising pathways to climate targets, 
involving large amounts of GGR. One participant saw this as an example of a common tendency 
“towards spreadsheet bias … the tool says, the rationality provided by Microsoft Excel says, that this 
is true” (25:60). The academic literature has also identified this problem, but so far, only limited 
efforts have been made to correct for it (Fuss et al., 2014; Beck and Mahony, 2018; Peters and 
Geden, 2017; Rogelj et al., 2019). 
Exaggeration and the power of promises  
The scenarios illuminated the power of promises. Many participants portrayed promises as 
powerful, regardless of material viability, and warned against the incentives for vested interests of 
greenwashing, or making fraudulent promises.  
One put their view simply: “It’s all spin. The technologies are not going to be realised” (25:7). Many 
suggested that mitigation deterrence would arise if GGR were seen as a ‘silver bullet’. The 
alternative was to seek “a solution that isn’t the kind of perfectly cost-optimal spreadsheet or model 
but, in fact, is a real world muddling through” (25:71). Experts in particular GGRs tended to argue 
that misleading promises were not produced by them, but by opponents of their technologies: “It 
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doesn’t matter what we tell … there will always be people to say you’re trying to present this as the 
entire solution …” (21:55).  
Other participants worried more about exaggeration by proponents of GGR or related interests. As 
one said: “[they highlight] the lowest cost estimate which you could feasibly do … you’ve seen that 
already with direct air capture” (22:9). Likewise, some noted more unequivocally deliberate efforts 
to mislead, especially by corporate interests, citing past examples of “chicanery” in electricity trading 
(26:17) and fraudulent behaviour in poorly verified offsetting (22:23). Similar fears were expressed 
about “greenwashing” in advocacy for “carbon capture and utilisation … instead of actually storing 
[CO2]” (24:22). Some argued that a focus on GGR could allow politicians and vested interests to 
defend slow mitigation: “I think the ambiguity is also part of the attraction” (23:82). Another 
explained, “if we use these [GGR] technologies … we’ll be able to use more coal and gas. It will … be 
a way [for] … the fossil fuel industry to keep their grip on the economies of the world” (24:30).  
Rational substitution and its failings 
The workshop discussions also confirmed ways in which promises – whether well-meaning or 
fraudulent – could interact with apparently rational economic and temporal substitution effects to 
create risks of deterrence outcomes.  
Some participants – typically early in our workshops – began with appeals to rational economics, 
arguing that allowing GGR removals to trade in well-regulated carbon markets is a straightforward 
way of funding their development and deployment. But for many participants, carbon markets and 
the implied offsetting mechanisms involved are themselves the problem, and adding GGR to them 
would make for more prevarication and delay. As one put it: “essentially you’re going to eat up the 
cheaper [GGR] reductions first, and leave yourself with a harder problem at the end of the day, and 
emissions will continue to increase” (26:5). As discussions progressed, we heard widespread deep 
scepticism about carbon markets. For instance: “a market is to make money for the traders; it’s not 
to reduce emissions” (25:15). Some participants therefore argued for measures that could establish 
a firm carbon price without allowing trading and offsetting. But carbon pricing mechanisms alone 
were not seen as a solution, given the incumbent political and economic interests involved: “at the 
moment, what we’re doing is leaving it up to markets … the whole GGR discourse just seems [to 
accept] that you create a carbon price and that will just fix everything and then you can just sit back. 
It’s clear that in terms of incumbency that approach doesn’t work” (22:105). 
Critiques of ‘rational’ substitution extended to international offsetting, and temporal transfers. For 
example: “[the] UK can say we’re going to do a bit in this space but actually we’re going to carry on 
high carbon lifestyles because in addition we can fund South Sudan to do what they need to do 
anyway” (23:7). Such international offsetting via GGR acts as an unfair ‘first mover advantage’, which 
poorer countries cannot imitate. We heard similar concerns about the temporal dimension of using 
future GGR to compensate for near-term emissions.  As one participant stressed: “what makes 
climate change such a particularly wicked problem for dealing with is that it is long-term and 
multigenerational. It’s very easy for people to give the semblance of taking action and then take 
their foot off the accelerator and coast for a bit before the next crisis hits” (23:135). 
Mechanisms vary with GGR techniques and politics 
Exploring different technologies and political scenarios helped highlight some mechanisms, because 
of differential susceptibility. GGR techniques not requiring large up-front capital investment, or 
where outcomes would be more difficult to monitor, were considered more susceptible to 
exaggerated promises. By contrast, those with high capital costs were seen as vulnerable to 
diversion to carbon utilisation in enhanced oil recovery or synthetic fuels. 
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We saw particular vulnerabilities to market-based offsetting mechanisms in the neo-liberal and 
business-as-usual political settings, while authoritarianism was anticipated to increase vulnerability 
by undermining international cooperation, and disrupting the institutions and mechanisms for 
delivery and monitoring of climate action. In this vein, several participants questioned why populist 
authoritarian leaders would even make promises about GGR: “does Trump even need an excuse not 
to do anything about climate change?” (22:3). But participants also recognised the vulnerability of a 
‘post-truth’ context to exaggerated promises, and continued claims that promises were being 
delivered, regardless of evidence: “I find this horribly plausible … regimes that do this stuff are 
[asking] … not ‘can we balance the numbers’, … [but] ‘have we got a story that we can tell that can 
buy off our supporters on this particular subject?’ (22:32). Trump’s more recent endorsement of the 
Trillion Tree goal, despite its huge limitations, would seem to confirm such fears. 
This section has outlined a range of mechanisms whereby deterrence might arise in the interplay of 
interests, promise and exaggeration. The discussions described a world with multiple incentives for 
delay based in promises, expectations and shared social imaginaries. Next we turn to some of the 
counter-arguments offered, and a series of common claims made about why mitigation deterrence 
might not be problematic. 
 
3.2 Reasons to be cheerful?   
Some participants were sceptical about the idea of mitigation deterrence, especially early in the 
sessions. There were three broad reactions to the idea of mitigation deterrence, typically advanced 
as reasons why it may not occur – or why, even if it were to occur, it might not be a problem. First, 
there was an argument that both GGR and emissions reduction are needed, and therefore both will 
happen. Second, some claimed GGRs were too expensive, or too limited in other ways, to materially 
undermine emissions reduction action. Third, several participants argued that delays in mitigation 
could not continue to be justified, and that ‘someone would have done something’ before the 
situation got as bad as depicted in our scenarios. These three ‘rationalist’ arguments can, however, 
also be understood as expressions of deterrence effects. In the workshops, we saw groups move 
beyond these claims and discuss ways to maximise GGR while simultaneously reducing emissions.   
‘Both emissions reduction and GGR are required’ 
A claim that ‘everything is needed’ was typically made on the basis that a 1.5°C limit on warming is 
now only deliverable with the aid of GGR, as an offset for recalcitrant emissions and/or as a tool to 
compensate for an overshoot in atmospheric CO2.  “If you want 1.5° you’ve got to throw everything 
at it, this and everything else” (29:35).  
In making such claims, some participants simply rejected the possibility of mitigation deterrence: 
“Obviously we will need negative emission technologies to put carbon somewhere else, to manage 
carbon. … the discussion about ‘this is going to slow down [mitigation]’ … I don’t buy that.” (21:59). 
Others acknowledged the risk, but deemed it irrational: “some people will see [BECCS] as a get out 
of jail card but I think that will be incredibly misguided. Both because deployment is so far off but 
also it’s kind of… it’s only ever going to be an insurance mechanism” (19:31). Such rejections were 
typically framed as assertions or declarations of belief, and other participants often pushed back, 
with comments like: “this worry that there will be mitigation deterrence is a very real issue” (26:21).  
Some participants deemed a risk of mitigation deterrence acceptable given the need for GGR: “we 
don’t have to slow down because we’re worried about this mitigation replacement thing. Let’s get 
ahead and do some of this stuff and if it turns out there is a lot of replacement then we’ve got time 
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to figure out financial and legal ways of restraining that” (26:73). A minority even advocated actively 
positioning GGR as a tool to allow continued fossil extraction (effectively encouraging substitution). 
Such views were justified by arguments that political will is inadequate to prevent overshoot, and 
thus GGR essential; and that such a framing could reduce opposition to climate action: “You can 
reframe GGR in ways to make it sound like something new rather than the same old, same old, 
global warming argument” (28:16).  
Participants also often cited ‘recalcitrance’ – the idea that certain emissions cannot be practically 
eliminated. As one participant argued: “… actually we’re going to need some greenhouse gas 
removals to remove some emissions that are truly recalcitrant. [These] may be really difficult to 
remove but actually societally really important that we have those functions going on” (23:85). 
However, other participants recognised that such claims presume both that the activities defended 
are genuinely socially useful, and that the emissions involved are genuinely recalcitrant. In practice, 
these are not objective ‘matters of fact’, but dynamic, qualitative, social judgements open to 
reappraisal given technological change or changing mores and habits. In some groups such problems 
were recognised: “I … fear that ‘negative emissions’ or ‘greenhouse gas removal’ is overused as a 
way of displacing too much recalcitrant emissions … [it is] used too broadly as a term” (23:10). One 
participant suggested a need to be “really strict about your definition of recalcitrant or residual 
emissions” (23:86).  
‘GGR itself is too limited, and the political climate unsupportive’ 
The second broad argument offered against deterrence being a serious problem is that the 
limitations of GGR – especially its high cost – mean it is unlikely to substitute for emissions cuts, 
especially if the political environment remains hostile to serious climate action. Participants’ views 
on this diverged widely. Where the workshops focused on one particular technology, such as direct 
air capture, such arguments were made more strongly. In the generic discussions, they rarely 
appeared, it perhaps being accepted that one or more GGRs might achieve scale at reasonable cost. 
For some, GGR “is going to be ‘a negligible rounding error’ … relative to other much more pressing 
issues. Populism and Trump and the economic transitions that we’re going through are far greater 
mitigation deterrents than anything to do with GGRs” (22:109). Historic delay was often explained 
through an economic lens, as a result of inappropriate economic incentives. For instance: “I’ve been 
working with this for 20 years and I’ve been hearing the same thing all the time. There’s no market. 
We can’t do this” (21:95). Or, more generally stated: “the fossil fuel industry is massively subsidised 
because it’s the only industry that’s allowed to throw away its waste without paying” (19:6).  
We also heard arguments that the scale of emissions reduction required makes displacement by 
limited techniques, such as enhanced weathering, “just totally unrealistic” (22:46). GGR was also 
sometimes seen as too expensive at scale to trigger deterrence: “GGR is not easy to do at the scales 
we’re talking … you’re talking gigatonnes here … the marginal cost curve is going to go exponentially 
high” (22:50). Others saw politics rather than revealed costs as the means to restrain exaggerated 
claims. For example “just messing around with soils … wouldn’t drown out other solutions because it 
wouldn't be … a political[ly] acceptable response to a bigger challenge” (23:4). Whether economic or 
political, however, such arguments show a strong faith in the powers of reason, at odds with the 
current ‘post-truth’ context in which promises (or downright lies) can be much more powerful than 
might seem rational. 
‘Someone would do something’ 
It was also argued that if GGR delivery were failing, or were stimulating deterrence effects, someone 
would do something about it. For example: “there’d be enough warnings and things, and science 
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would be kind of stopping it from happening” (22:38). In a similar vein, the limitations of GGR would 
be exposed by rigorous assessment of the technologies by governments or investors: “people who 
control the money are going to look at it and go ‘hell no! The numbers just don’t work out’” (22:57). 
Or, more generally, exaggerated promises cannot persist: ‘bullshit has a half-life’ as one group 
memorably claimed. “So long as you can get away with the bullshit factor you will be able to get 
away with [it] … But, the half-life [of] bullshit … isn’t 15 years, in the sense that by that point in time 
you’ve got enough analysis” (22:51). In another, public engagement was invoked as the factor that 
would dispel exaggeration: “I find it strange that we wouldn't have any [public] input at all especially 
seeing [corruption and inaction] unfold and other potential climate impacts” (23:100). This also 
implies an expectation that as climate impacts get more severe there will be a point after which 
delay and dissimulation would no longer be possible.  
In two groups we heard assertions that previous fears about adaptation displacing or delaying 
mitigation action had not materialised, implying in context that GGR would also not have such an 
effect. Such claims emerged even as the groups consistently accepted the historic persistence of 
delay in delivering mitigation. Delay was understood as a natural consequence of a lack of political 
will, whereas neither the influence of promises about GGR or adaptation on political will, nor the 
novel temporal character of GGR promises, seemed easy to consider.   
These objections are all ‘rationalist’ interpretations that largely disregard historical experience of 
persistent delay, continued active resistance by vested interests, and repeated technological 
promises of future action (McLaren and Markusson, 2020). To dismiss the possibility of serious 
deterrence through such arguments, one would have to assume that ‘promises’ can’t substitute for 
action; that things that are small or expensive can’t substitute (rhetorically and in policy) for big or 
cheaper ones; and that rational critique and assessment would necessarily be able to change 
political practice. All these assumptions fall into the rationalist register of discourse described above.  
These arguments do indicate that not all participants accepted the premise of mitigation deterrence. 
However, the majority did. Political susceptibility was seen as commonplace: “any get-out-of-jail 
card for the harder bits of decarbonisation someone will grab hold of, whether it makes sense, 
whether it works, whether the science backs it up or not, even whether the economics backs it up or 
not” (22:41). Further, even those who expressed initial scepticism often came to accept or express 
the effects of mitigation deterrence as they worked through the scenarios.  
 
3.3 What can be done  
In this section we turn to the interventions that participants suggested to promote the delivery of 
GGR while minimising deterrence effects. The suggestions included reforming or regulating markets; 
treating GGR separately in policy and strategy; facing down the political power of incumbency 
especially in in fossil-based industry; and providing more transparency and accountability. 
Restrict and regulate markets  
Participants who did not acknowledge deterrence risks tended to support pricing and offsetting 
interventions. As one argued, “We need a price on CO2 emissions and … we need to fund negative 
emissions. If we link those two needs with each other, which is quite obvious, then the polluters will 
have to pay for removing the CO2 from the atmosphere which is fair and this will solve the 
impossibility of funding negative emissions any other way.” (21:18). These views seem rooted in a 
neoliberal social imaginary, in which markets are the primary policy tools, and the tradeability of any 
unit of CO2 for another via money is unquestioned.  
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Such strong faith in markets was, however, a minority view. More typically, participants emphasized 
the weaknesses of markets, and the need for infrastructure and governance that markets won’t 
provide. One argued: “paying for carbon dioxide removal should be done much as we think about 
paying for armouries or police or health services … it’s very hard to promote carbon negativity when 
you’re trying to tax what we’re trying to remove” (21:101). Some groups wanted to harness markets 
to promote efficiency, but called for tough regulation to structure markets in ways that could reduce 
the downsides of substitution and offsetting, such as a continually tightening cap driving total 
emissions lower.   
Several participants advocated measures which establish value for carbon removal without relying 
on markets; for example, through a mandate imposed on fossil extractive industries to deliver 
incrementally larger removal targets for every tonne of CO2 generated by their activities and 
products (Haszeldine et al., 2018). If a carbon market remained: “That market has to value CO2 
stored or removed by cancelling certificates” (25:86). Such mandates would internalise the cost 
trade-offs, but are not invulnerable to deterrence effects. Such a scheme might itself provide 
misplaced confidence in the future delivery of GGR, or legitimate a slower reduction in fossil use 
than otherwise possible.  
Carbon pricing faced further criticism from those most concerned about mitigation deterrence. They 
argued that the attraction of delay cannot simply be overcome by putting a price on carbon, because 
of distributional effects and public opposition, as seen in the French ‘gilets jaunes’. This wasn’t to 
reject financial incentives outright, but to engage with some of the difficulties involved in making 
them effective and fair. 
Building an effective and separate GGR strategy  
There was fairly consistent support for a clear long-term GGR strategy: “a proper developed … [GGR] 
strategy led by the state at some arm’s length distance from technology developers and industry 
interests” (21:83). This would involve dedicated financial incentives for GGR rather than (or in 
addition to) a generic carbon price to stimulate experimentation and development. To help minimise 
substitution, it was argued, incentives should target removal, rather than utilisation. 
Facing down power and incumbency 
Most critically, participants argued that such a strategy needed actively to defuse the power of 
vested interests such as aviation and fossil energy, to prevent such sectors co-opting GGR as an 
offset, and redefining their activities as ‘recalcitrant’.  Vested interests should not be allowed to 
mobilise promises of GGR so as to resist action to reduce fossil fuel extraction. As one participant 
argued: “the thing that needs to happen is active deconstruction of that incumbency ... We need to 
actually actively close down these systems” (22:103).   
Participants called for an international and intergenerational context for a GGR strategy, challenging 
not only the power of industry but also the power of nation states and the current generation. This 
would: “avoid getting locked into national level optimisations of GGR … [that] miss out the need for 
some countries to do more than others” (22:94), and would require “those that initiate this process 
… to have some commitment to the future rather than just the short term” (22:125). Some groups 
suggested that the attraction of delay, and the potential for temporal substitution of GGR for 
emissions reduction, could be reduced by developing a strategy with structured targets or carbon 
budgets for successive time-periods.  
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Deflating exaggerated promises with enhanced accountability 
A key way suggested to deflate GGR promises was to control the incentives for exaggeration by 
increasing accountability. Proposals for strengthened corporate and political accountability arose in 
many groups, and some also advocated new media accountability measures. Suggestions included 
both improved governance procedures and greater public involvement: “Things like better corporate 
governance to stop this secretive influencing going on, action towards better democratic governance 
and, in particular … civil society resistance” (26:58). Public engagement, transparency, and 
accountability all came to the fore in different discussions: “you have to have some degree of 
transparency ... some degree of accountability for false, misleading or deceptive practices” (26:16). 
Arguing particularly for media accountability, one participant suggested: “mitigation deterrence is 
largely about belief. I think it’s fundamentally a media issue. A media systems reform is actually 
fundamental to the dynamics of it” (24:93).  
Separation to minimise substitution 
Participants identified various dedicated interventions to minimise substitution of GGR for emissions 
reduction. More generally, they proposed reserving the limited and expensive capacity of GGR 
techniques for the restorative function of reducing atmospheric CO2, rather than permitting its use 
as an offset. Critical to managing such approaches is a principle of separation, proposed or endorsed 
in virtually all groups. For example: “This has to happen completely independent of all other climate 
[action]” to prevent a politician deciding that “we’re doing enough now on this and slow[ing] down 
on all other climate mitigation” (23:5).  
In several groups, participants – while broadly supportive – debated just how far to take separation. 
Some sought an entire separate policy framework, but for others dedicated accounting, designed 
with consideration of existing regimes to avoid overlaps and loopholes, would be enough. Many 
supported separate incentives, such as through: “a dedicated market … not just a carbon price that 
applies to the whole … economy that might not roll out any … [expensive GGR] till the very end” 
(29:41). A key argument was to support new technology: “When you have a new technology that’s 
by definition unreliable, being developed, you need a different form of support” (19:91). But one 
participant highlighted a risk if dedicated mechanisms continued to provide a higher financial 
incentive for removal than for emissions reduction because it could become profitable for a business 
to continue to emit more so it could then capture more: “It could be totally counterproductive” 
(21:74).  
Strengthening delivery 
We have already noted several interventions which could act to strengthen delivery of GGR. For 
instance, greater public engagement could reduce the risk of failure through public opposition. 
Measures to avoid fraudulent and exaggerated promises would limit the likelihood of public or 
policy backlashes that could also undermine deployment. Well-structured incentives and corporate 
accountability measures may help curtail rebounds from problems such as use of captured CO2 in 
enhanced oil recovery. Here we would note that there was a great deal of scepticism about other 
methods – besides targeted incentives – for funding GGR development. The critiques of simple 
carbon pricing and carbon market mechanisms were outlined above, but participants also rejected 
measures such as innovation prizes.  
Effective monitoring and verification were frequently advocated. Along with the accountability 
benefits already described, these measures were often supported for very practical reasons. They 
would help identify problems or failures in removals or storage, help detect undesirable side effects 
or carbon rebound effects and enable corrective action to ensure delivery. For instance, there was a 
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call for: “a huge amount of robust monitoring … [of GGR] operations or the effects of those 
operations or the side effects of those operations, [and] … the governance systems” (22:95).  
In some groups, participants also took the view that failure cannot always be prevented – so 
redundancy, across a portfolio of GGR would be important. Acknowledging the risks of failure as a 
result of future leakage, especially with techniques such as soil carbon restoration which require 
ongoing maintenance of carbon stores, several groups saw particular value in identifying and 
incentivising co-benefits beyond climatic effects (Mayrhofer and Gupta, 2016). Some argued that 
such an approach would not only sustain storage, but strengthen stakeholder support and delivery 
more broadly.  
Beyond technical interventions 
While some few participants remained sceptical of the underlying need for interventions to minimise 
deterrence, most considered the proposed interventions valuable anyway as a means of 
strengthening delivery of GGR. On the other hand, those most concerned about problems of delay 
and deterrence tended to argue for more systemic change, rather than seeking to design new 
markets or regulatory systems. For example: “we actually need some sort of public conversation on 
what it means to be human at the moment in relation to the planet” (24:51). 
 
4. Discussion  
Our findings suggest that there are good reasons to worry about mitigation deterrence, and that 
concerns about deterrence effects are widely shared amongst climate/GGR stakeholders. However, 
for many stakeholders, the urgency of climate action, and the failure so far to achieve adequate 
mitigation, create a context in which delivering GGR is seen as more important than any possible 
interaction effects. They express concerns that worrying about mitigation deterrence might unduly 
constrain or hamper action to research or deliver GGR. However, when exposed to unsettling 
scenarios and engaged with the topic, most stakeholders recognised that aspects of the dominant 
social imaginary and the political economy of climate change (such as presumptions about science-
based policy, expectations regarding innovation, and faith in markets) act to downplay and conceal 
important drivers of mitigation deterrence (the attraction of delay, vested interests in deploying 
GGR as offsets, etc.). As a result, stakeholders (even those most sceptical of the extent of the 
problem of mitigation deterrence) overwhelmingly supported interventions that would help 
minimise the impacts of deterrence – notably measures to separate accounting and incentives for 
GGR from those for emissions reduction – within a broad climate strategy that includes positive 
support for GGR.   
The workshops were not designed to reach consensus. Yet many participants became more open to 
considering deterrence problems, and discussing the ambiguities and tensions involved, as they 
moved beyond the ‘rationalist’ register in the course of the discussions (as reported in sections 3.2 
and 3.3 above). In addition, we argue that the presence of rationalist arguments against deterrence 
in the workshops is itself an indicator of the prevalence of the problem. Conventional approaches to 
climate policy draw heavily on science and rationalism. But ‘rationalist’ rejections of concerns over 
deterrence such as those noted in Section 3.2 risk increasing the spaces within which deterrence 
effects can occur. Reliance on calculative integrated assessment modelling with its inherent 
preference for future speculative technology over apparently costly near-term mitigation (see also 
McLaren 2020) is one such risk. Another arises in the way that a rationalist register interprets the 
‘post-truth’ phenomenon of ‘fake news’ being propagated by vested commercial and political 
interests as merely ‘irrational’ exceptions to what is otherwise understood as fundamentally rational 
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political discourse. As we saw in section 3.2, responses located in a rationalist register tend to 
downplay the political and cultural significance of such processes and thus unwittingly risk enabling 
deterrence. This implies that it is critical for policy not simply to declare the possibility of mitigation 
deterrence ‘irrational’, but to acknowledge and engage with it, and with its underlying – and 
evidently manifest – cultural, political and social drivers.  
Recognising the problem 
Our research indicates the importance of naming and making explicit the problem of mitigation 
deterrence. As seen above, even some engaged experts and stakeholders experience persistent 
obstacles to talking about the issue. From this perspective, the workshop accounts also offer insights 
into the subjective experience of living with the pressures and tensions that underlie mitigation 
deterrence. It appeared easier for many stakeholders to think in terms of the kinds of interaction 
effects between options (such as price and resource competition) that models are relatively good at 
handling, whereas the kinds of cultural and political economy effects revealed here are less intuitive 
or familiar. For example, initial efforts to rebut deterrence problems often reflected an individualist 
economic approach presenting substitution (of GGR for mitigation, through markets or offsetting), 
as rational, unproblematic, and largely disconnected from the realm of exaggerated promises, failure 
risks, unintended emergent ‘common-senses’ and side-effects that became clear later in the 
discussions. Such views of substitution perhaps represent a misplaced assumption of fungibility 
between emissions reductions and carbon removals, which in turn reflects the dominant neoliberal 
social imaginary (Groves, 2014; Markusson et al., 2018). They also illustrate the shortcomings of the 
conventional ‘moral hazard’ framing, in which the risk of mitigation deterrence is understood mainly 
in terms of individually and rationally assessed risks and benefits (McLaren 2016; Markusson et al 
2018). 
Moreover, thinking about mitigation deterrence from GGR can be painful.6 For participants 
concerned about climate change and aware of the magnitude of the problem, there is a tension 
inherent in considering the possibility that pursuing GGR – seen by most as an essential contribution 
to managing climate change – might at the same time risk exacerbating the problem. Contemplating 
this tension can be emotionally difficult. We suspect it was therefore important for many 
participants first to express support for and defend GGR, before being comfortable in acknowledging 
the risks of mitigation deterrence and exploring such unintended consequences, especially amidst 
groups of relative strangers. As the sessions moved into discussion of mechanisms and particularly 
interventions, the opportunity to offer responses that could both help deliver GGR and minimise 
deterrence generated more wholehearted acknowledgement and analysis of the deterrence 
problem. And our scenario methodology functioned effectively to facilitate collective engagement 
with mitigation deterrence, as a possible challenge to everyone, irrespective of politics. We would 
therefore recommend such deliberation as a key part of policy development (Flyvbjerg et al., 2012), 
as a tool to enable policy-makers to recognise and engage with the problem.  
Understanding the mechanisms  
Acknowledging the problem of deterrence is a first key step in addressing it. But the workshops also 
help us understand the mechanisms of deterrence. While often not formal experts in such 
considerations, and in some cases uncomfortable with them (as noted above), the participants 
nonetheless informatively explored underlying cultural, economic and political drivers – the 
construction of promises, the incentives for exaggeration, and the interests involved in constructing 
and communicating promises (including modellers, media, and commercial actors). In their 
                                                          
6 This aspect of the workshops is discussed further in [redacted for anonymity] (forthcoming). 
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discussions, we saw reflected the social imaginaries that structure contemporary societies – 
imaginaries of rational economics, scientific advice, market-based policy measures, administrative 
policy development, and commodification of carbon (cf Carton, 2020; Carton et al., 2021; Lohmann, 
2005; Groves, 2014). We also saw critiques of those imaginaries in contributions that highlighted the 
ways in which businesses, politicians and others are predictably attracted to delay, and how they use 
language to exaggerate and mislead to such ends.  
GGR promises are just one example of the ‘attraction of delay’ in a setting in which there are many 
incentives for politicians, businesses and publics to promote or accept delay. We do not suggest that 
our deliberations revealed something exclusive to GGR. But to attribute delay and deterrence to all 
sorts of other factors, but not GGR, as some participants did, would demand explanation of why 
excessive expectations generated by GGR promises would be uniquely counteracted by rationalist 
approaches. In the discussions, such participants instead reinforced arguments as to why GGRs 
themselves might not materialise in practice (cf Waller et al., 2020; Thoni et al., 2020), suggesting 
that GGR promises should be treated sceptically, and implicitly making a case for protections against 
mitigation deterrence, rather than a case to dismiss it. Moreover, unlike many other promises, 
exaggeration about GGR cannot be rationally dispelled in ‘real-time’, because GGR acts as a ‘time-
machine’ in climate policy, being able to promise future reversal of current and past emissions, and 
thus becoming a ‘temporal’ socio-ecological fix (cf Ekers and Prudham, 2017; Sapinski, 2016).   
More generally, in the processes described by some participants we see clear echoes of Stephen 
Gardiner’s (2011) concern about ‘moral corruption’ in climate policy. Gardiner sees a serious moral 
failing when those both responsible for most historic emissions, and with the capacity to take action, 
delay action to address climate change. He suggests that moral corruption might be at play when 
such actors self-justify prevarication, on the basis of claims of high cost or practical difficulty, but 
with outcomes that maintain their comfort and lifestyles, at the risk of the lives and wellbeing of 
those least responsible for climate change. What seems logical can still be a moral failing, and in 
such circumstances we may need help to understand our motivations for delay. 
Any intervention that provides a ‘semblance of action’, or a basis for the self-delusion that delay can 
be justified, might be deployed as a prevarication. But reliance on GGR promises in such 
circumstances is more problematic, because it extends the potential period of delay into an era of 
emissions overshoot. Whether technological (such as nuclear power) or behavioural (such as life-
style change), no previous promise, however exaggerated, could offer to reverse past emissions. In 
recent years, offsetting has been a central mechanism for prevarication despite similar concerns 
about its effectiveness (Watt, 2021). But now that carbon budgets are being exhausted, the scientific 
and political credibility of offsetting action to other countries or other sectors is declining. We 
appear to need not merely techno-fixes but ‘retro-techno-fixes’ – technological promises which can 
“change the past” (Anderson, 2015), effectively acting as time machines. GGR offers such a promise 
to actors facing real material incentives to delay action and transfer the costs to others. Even as the 
spatial carbon frontier seems to be closing, the promises of GGR are extending a temporal carbon 
frontier. 
Promoting solutions 
As outlined in section 3, participants offered a wide range of potential interventions. These 
interventions offer opportunities to minimise deterrence that can be integrated with ways to 
stimulate delivery of GGR, but only as long as the problem is actually recognised, not just dismissed. 
Indeed, designing and framing interventions in this way is more likely to ensure wide support (Cox et 
al., 2020). Active measures to control deterrence such as improved monitoring and verification 
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would not only make fraudulent offsetting more difficult, but would also help validate GGR for the 
targeting of incentives. In such ways anti-deterrence measures would likely lead to more GGR 
delivery as well as to more conventional mitigation.  
Witch-hunting, framing and group composition 
Before concluding, we want briefly to consider some possible criticisms. Did our methods possibly 
create or construct fears of mitigation deterrence in the participants through the framings used? It is 
true that all the scenarios involved some forms of deterrence and that the discussions focused on 
this issue. However, our participants were given ample opportunity to challenge both the scenarios 
and the mechanisms suggested. Some did so, though typically briefly, while others appeared to be 
more comfortable discussing the problem in this environment.    
In reviewing our methods and findings the team also embarked on some reflexive questioning. In 
particular, we asked whether our reactions to those who sought to downplay or rebut deterrence 
effects constituted ‘witch-hunting’. Were we seeing (concealed) deterrence effects in those who 
denied being affected, while welcoming the admissions of those who agreed that there might be a 
problem – and thus offering interpretations that were both unfalsifiable and unfair? While we did 
conclude that denying the risk of deterrence might enable it, we do not claim that our participants 
demonstrated that personally, and have been careful to consider other explanations as to why 
participants might have questioned deterrence.  
Finally, were our groups particularly susceptible to worries about deterrence because of their 
composition? We assembled groups that were broadly representative of GGR stakeholders, and, if 
anything, we suspect the opposite: that the group composition may have increased scepticism about 
deterrence. Our groups were predominantly male, northern, white and educated (comparable to the 
WEIRD – white, educated, industrialised, rich and democratic – bias noted in psychology (Henrich et 
al., 2010)), likely therefore to share both the rationalist world view highlighted earlier, and the 
privilege that tends to increase susceptibility to moral corruption. The variation between our groups 
in gender balance, and inclusion of young, student voices was not great enough to draw firm 
conclusions about the impacts of group composition on the content and tenor of the discussions. 
However, we did see an apparent tendency for groups with more youthful and fewer ‘expert’ 
participants to experience more wide-ranging conversations. And certain arguments were made 
exclusively by particular demographics. For example unequivocal support for CO2 pricing was voiced 
only by older, white men, perhaps because they were less likely to question social and political 
orthodoxies (See section 3.3).  In our analysis, we have sought to surface the imaginaries reflected 
and voiced by participants, and this leads us to suspect that more diversity would probably have 
provided more and deeper challenges to the dominant, rationalist, economistic social imaginary 
unconsciously shared by many of our participants.    
 
5. Conclusions  
Collective deliberation on GGR enables stakeholders to recognise risks of mitigation deterrence 
which arise from emerging and often exaggerated promises – conveyed through models, media and 
political debate – regarding the future contribution of GGR to addressing climate change. In this 
respect, GGR discourse can be understood as exemplary of how technological promises are enrolled 
in cultural, economic and political processes to enable prevarication and delay where significant 
change that is not purely technological and instrumental would threaten the dominant social order. 
In other words, through a combination of ‘objectivist rationalisations’, taken-for granted elements of 
capitalist hegemony, and isolated technological imaginaries, evaluations of GGR on a ‘rationalist’ 
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register not only overestimate feasibility (Waller et al., 2020; Thoni et al., 2020) but also underpin 
multiple dynamics of delay, ‘enabled’ – using Stoddard et al’s (2021) term – by politically naïve 
scientific endorsement of ideological constructs such as commodification and offsetting. Such 
practices also enable hegemonic economic interests to mobilise GGR promises as (spatio-)temporal 
fixes as a means of avoiding politically transformative change (Markusson et al., forthcoming). 
Yet, in collective deliberation, stakeholders also tended to converge on potential measures to 
counter these effects and to strengthen the delivery of GGR in practice. These measures include the 
formal separation of GGR incentives, targets and accounting from emissions reduction policy; 
greater emphasis on interventions (such as enhanced liability and accountability) to counteract or 
dismantle the power of incumbent vested interests, and to deflate the power of exaggerated 
promises; provision of strong incentives for GGR beyond carbon prices and carbon markets, 
including incentives based on co-benefits; and tough standards of monitoring, reporting and 
verification. 
The challenges we found in generating discussion of deterrence problems illustrate the value of 
having an analytic framework and a language in which such cultural, political and economic effects 
can be taken seriously and considered reflexively, even by those not self-consciously adept or 
comfortable in such considerations. When discussion remained on a rationalist register, the full 
extent of the risks was not revealed. It was only in the depths of our workshop discussions that the 
distinctive temporal dimensions of these promises, and the ways that promises themselves can act 
to reconstruct their subjects (for example, the way GGR enables recalcitrance to be redefined), came 
to the fore. But this happened in the workshops regardless of the composition of the group and their 
explicit professional orientation to such broader social issues, as participants brought their broader 
experience as sophisticated social, political and cultural agents, not just their specific knowledge and 
cognitive expertise, to bear collectively on the discussion. These results speak positively of the 
potential for broad public engagement in such discussions leading to insights and learning for those 
involved, moving beyond a default and ‘common-sense’ rationalist register.  
Our findings may also be of more general use in the climate debate. The perspective applied here 
suggests the need for deeper engagement with the political-economic and cultural dimensions of 
climate change. If we can understand and counter the reasons for mitigation deterrence from GGR, 
this may help us better understand and counter the causes of resistance to mitigation action more 
generally. And in the reasons for ‘rejection’ of this problem (and by whom, using what narratives), 
there are insights as to why reasonable people get caught up in practices of policy advice or other 
interventions that enable or cause continued delay. This is critical in the current ‘climate emergency’ 
discourse. How is it that politicians can acknowledge a climate emergency, yet also grant 
permissions for new coalmines, pipelines or airport expansions, and bail out existing bankrupt 
airlines? (Willis, 2019). Our analysis of the way technological promises are mobilised in service of the 
dominant social imaginary offers a way to understand – and perhaps begin to overcome – the 
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